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Walking	away	from	the	Good	Friday	Agreement	may
look	easy.	Picking	up	the	pieces	will	take	decades
Britain	cannot	leave	the	Single	Market	and	customs	union	without	destabilising	the	Good	Friday
Agreement.	Duncan	Morrow	(University	of	Ulster)	explains	why	Brexiters	have	identified	the
Agreement	as	the	biggest	single	obstacle	to	their	vision.	Walking	away	from	the	Good	Friday
Agreement	may	look	easy.	Picking	up	the	pieces	could	last	a	lifetime.
It	may	be	1690	since	the	politics	of	the	north	of	Ireland	were	so	central	to	the	geopolitics	of
Europe.	It	is	certainly	almost	a	hundred	years	since	Irish	issues	had	the	potential	to	define	the
politics	of	the	United	Kingdom	as	a	whole.		But	gradually	and	unmistakably,	the	fragility	of	Northern	Ireland	and	the
powerful	symbolism	of	the	‘Good	Friday	Agreement’	have	combined	to	become	the	single	greatest	obstacle	to	the
drive	for	unrestricted	sovereignty	and	border	control	that	powers	Brexit.	The	scramble	over	the	Joint	Declaration
demonstrated	that	the	cross-border	integration	at	the	heart	of	the	Good	Friday	Agreement	(GFA)	ran	a	coach	and
horses	through	the	‘one	leap	and	we’re	free’	version	of	Brexit.	It	was	then	inevitable	that	committed	Brexiters	would
turn	their	fire	not	only	on	the	customs	union,	but	on	the	Agreement	itself.
For	anyone	who	was	there,	the	Good	Friday	Agreement	was	the	watershed	in	British-Irish	relations.		Even	its
detractors	understand	the	emotional	and	historic	importance	of	a	deal	accepted	by	the	majority	Unionists	and
Nationalists,	Republicans	and	Loyalists,	the	UK	and	Ireland	at	one	time.	But	over	time,	especially	since	the	financial
crash,	the	Agreement	lost	its	elan	in	London	and	Dublin;		increasingly.	the	only	measure	of	its	effectiveness	was	the
absence	of	violence	and	the	extent	to	which	Northern	Irish	affairs	could	be	‘managed	off’	the	agenda	of	governments,
and	contained	within	Northern	Ireland.
A	Sinn	Fein-led	protest	against	Brexit	at	Stormont.	Photo:	Sinn	Fein	via	a	CC	BY	2.0	licence
In	part,	this	was	a	matter	of	personnel.	Unlike	John	Major	and	Tony	Blair,	Gordon	Brown	and	David	Cameron	missed
the	emotion	of	the	occasion.		The	same	was	true	of	Enda	Kenny	in	Dublin.		This	was	not	their	deal.		In	part	it	was	a
matter	of	context:	seen	alongside	global	austerity,	war	in	Syria	and	Brexit,	Northern	Ireland	seemed	petty	and	trivial.	
But	largely	it	was	a	matter	of	the	failure	of	the	Agreement	and	wider	British-Irish	relations	to	decisively	shift
sectarianism	and	antagonism	in	Northern	Ireland.
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Within	months	of	signing,	the	practical	horizon	of	the	Agreement	had	narrowed	to	establishing	power-sharing	in
Belfast.	Devolution	–	rather	than	reconciliation	–	became	paramount,	and	the	Agreement	increasingly	resembled	a
Swiss	cheese,	with	significant	holes	carved	out	around	commitments	now	regarded	as	obstacles.		Parts	of	the
original	text	–	especially	the	bits	about	governing	together	in	Northern	Ireland	–	were	diluted	by	the	governments	at
St	Andrews	to	incentivise	the	old	enemies	of	the	DUP	and	Sinn	Fein	into	partnership.	A	pragmatic	blind	eye	was
turned	as	many	of	the	more	ambitious	‘reconciliation’	goals	of	the	Agreement	for	Shared	Futures,	Bills	of	Rights	and
Civic	Forums	were	shelved	or	ignored.
In	the	absence	of	any	review	or	oversight	mechanism,	devolution	to	Northern	Ireland	removed	day-to-day
management	of	the	dreary	steeples	from	the	desks	of	ministers	in	the	metropolis.	For	this	at	least,	both	governments
gave	thanks.	In	any	case,	devolution	on	the	UK	model	means	that	any	pressure	from	outside	can	be	quickly
characterised	as	interference.	With	perceptible	relief,	wider	British-Irish	stewardship	of	the	Agreement	became
essentially	symbolic:	it	was	confined	to	successful	state	visits	and	sporadic	irritating	emergency	rescue	visits	to
Northern	Ireland,	most	of	which	involved	requests	for	injections	of	money.	In	the	capitals	which	created	it,	the	Good
Friday	Agreement	became	less	of	a	miracle	and	more	of	a	mechanism	for	arms-length	management	and	occasional
pious	rhetoric.
While	the	ostensible	trigger	for	the	outbreak	of	public	hostility	to	the	GFA	was	the	final	collapse	of	negotiations	to	re-
establish	power-sharing	government	in	Northern	Ireland,	history	will	probably	record	that	causality	was	reversed:	the
consequences	of	the	Brexit	referendum	suddenly	exposed	how	deeply	the	governments	of	both	Ireland	and	Britain
relied	on	the	partnership	of	the	Good	Friday	Agreement	and	shared	membership	of	the	EU	to	stabilise	Northern
Ireland.	When	the	EU	made	clear	that	it	would	back	Ireland	in	its	demand	that	Brexit	should	uphold	the	seamless
cross-border	relationships	established	in	1998,	the	path	to	confrontation	opened.
The	logical	pathway	for	the	Brexit	radicals	was	clear:	if	sovereignty	over	borders	is	the	decisive	measure	of	Brexit,
then	the	Good	Friday	Agreement,	with	its	cross-border,	inter-state,	international	commitments	is	no	longer	a	miracle,
but	a	curse.	When	the	DUP	unexpectedly	emerged	from	the	General	Election	holding	the	balance	of	power	at
Westminster,	any	room	for	the	Conservative	party	to	enforce	‘special’	arrangements	for	Northern	Ireland	which
involved	increasing	the	length	of	the	arm	evaporated.	By	December	it	was	clear	the	government	was	officially
between	a	rock	and	a	hard	place.
The	collapse	of	talks	designed	to	restore	devolution	in	Belfast	last	week	confirmed	what	most	observers	in	Northern
Ireland	already	knew:		under	stress	from	the	unresolved	issues	of	reconciliation	–	be	it	the	bitterness	and
recrimination	characterising	relations	over	violence	in	the	past,	the	failure	to	resolve	any	significant	cultural	dispute	or
extend	equality	since	2007,	or	the	unwillingness	to	soften	the	sectarian	boundary	in	education,	housing	or	politics	–
the	final	straw	was	a	language	dispute.	But	even	these	were	increasingly	trivial	compared	to	the	mounting	anxiety,
spoken	and	unspoken,	about	the	border	in	the	face	of	Brexit.
The	collapse	of	devolution	opened	the	way	for	a	co-ordinated	effort	to	declare	war	on	the	GFA	itself.		A	former
Secretary	of	State	for	Northern	Ireland,	Owen	Patterson,	led	the	charge.	In	the	blink	of	an	eye,	Daniel	Hannan
abandoned	the	silky	assurances	he	offered	during	the	referendum	that	nothing	would	change.	Less	surprisingly,	Kate
Hoey,	Labour’s	ultra-Unionist	Brexit	cheerleader,	joined	in.	(Northern)	Ireland’s	difficulty	is	England’s	opportunity,	or
at	least	necessity.	In	the	face	of	the	collapse	of	devolution,	the	Agreement	was	declared	dead	and,	in	one	fell	swoop,
was	removed	from	the	pathway	to	a	smooth	and	hard	Brexit.
If	only	it	were	that	simple.	Few	people	may	have	actually	read	the	Agreement,	but	a	quick	glance	at	the	text	might
just	delay	fateful	decisions	being	taken	without	considering	the	potential	future	consequences.		Above	all,	any	move
to	walk	away	unilaterally	will	reveal	that	devolution	is	less	than	half	of	the	problem.
Because	at	its	heart,	the	GFA	was	a	blueprint	for	British-Irish	relations	beyond	any	letter	of	the	law	–	a	historic	sea-
change	in	the	relationship	of	two	post-imperial	states.		The	explicit	acknowledgement	of	human	suffering	arising	from
conflict	and	the	commitment	to	reconciliation,	tolerance	and	mutual	trust	can	be	belittled	as	sentimentality,	but	in	the
context	of	British-Irish	affairs	they	represent	a	revolution.		Without	the	Agreement,	there	is	nothing	in	Irish	history
which	acknowledges	the	requirement	for	partnership,	equality	and	mutual	respect.	And	there	is	nothing	which
commits	everyone	to	“exclusively	democratic	and	peaceful	means	of	resolving	differences	on	political	issues.”	The
Agreement	re-orientated	the	constitutional	relationship	of	two	states	to	each	other	and	to	Northern	Ireland.	Ireland
made	this	explicit	by	changes	to	two	Articles	of	the	written	constitution.
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The	UK	modified	the	doctrine	of	parliamentary	sovereignty	by	accepting	in	an	international	treaty	that	the
constitutional	settlement	of	Ireland	was	a	matter	for	the	people	of	Ireland	alone	‘without	external	impediment’.	By
acknowledging	that	British	sovereignty	in	Northern	Ireland	reflected	consent,	anti-imperial	reasons	to	refuse
legitimacy	vanished.	Uniquely,	every	person	could	choose	to	be	‘Irish	or	British	or	both’	in	every	and	all	futures	–	and
would	be	treated	with	absolute	equality.	Any	one	of	these	changes	would	have	been	historic,	but	to	contain	them	in
one	document	was	truly	breathtaking.
More	urgently,	the	Agreement	underpinned	the	rule	of	law	and	assured	citizen	equality.	All	parties	committed	to	the
total	disarmament	of	all	paramilitary	organisations	and	the	British	government	committed	to	a	process	for
demilitarisation.	Commitment	to	policing	reform	was	agreed,	and	international	law	in	the	form	of	European
Convention	of	Human	Rights,	a	full-scale	criminal	justice	Reform	and	Equality	law	was	upfront	and	central,	including
the	important	but	undeveloped	concept	of	‘parity	of	esteem’.
Any	unilateral	decision	to	declare	the	Good	Friday	Agreement	dead	raises	the	question	of	what	happens	to	all	of	it.
But	the	Brexit	process	has	now	inevitably	brought	us	to	that	point.	Even	worse,	it	does	so	with	time	running	out	for
negotiations.	Negotiating	the	GFA	took	years.		Walking	away	from	the	Good	Friday	Agreement	may	look	easy:
picking	up	the	pieces	could	last	a	lifetime.	The	hand	of	history	is	moving	again,	and	not	necessarily	in	a	good	way.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
Professor	Duncan	Morrow	is	a	lecturer	in	politics	at	Ulster	University	and	has	published	widely	in	the	fields	of	conflict
resolution,	Northern	Ireland	politics	and	the	relationship	between	religion	and	politics.
Also	by	Duncan	Morrow:
Brexit	has	blown	open	the	unreconciled	divisions	in	Northern	Ireland
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